2. Second Reason and Rejection of it

16. Another reason is posited [Henry of Ghent, Aquinas] for this conclusion [n.10], namely that two dispositions the same in species cannot be located in the same thing; these two filiations, if they were in the same thing, would be the same in species;     therefore etc     .

17. The major is made clear by others [Godfrey of Fontaines] as follows:

First because potency is per se related to form and not per se to ‘this form’, because it is a ‘this’ through what it receives in the form; therefore, if it could be in act as regard one form and in potency as regard another, then the same thing in respect of the same thing (namely in respect of the form in which - as such - it happens to be this or that) would be in potency and in act first.

Second because every distinction is either by nature of division or by nature of opposition; a distinction in the same species by nature of opposition is impossible, and impossible by nature of division where the subject is the same, because accidents get numerical distinction, as they get entity, only from their subjects.

18. And the proof [Godfrey] is that there cannot be several properties in divine reality of the same idea, because they would not be distinguished either by opposition or by division unless the divine essence - in which they exist - were divided, which is unacceptable;     therefore etc     .

19. The inference [n.16] is made clear [Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent] by the fact that someone who generates by a first act of generation acquires paternity with respect to a first son, and acquires no new paternity by a second act of generating but is related to a second son by the same paternity; therefore, just as there cannot be several paternities in this case, because the forms are of the same species, so for the same reason there cannot be several filiations in Christ’s case.

20. Against this argument [n.16]: the major seems false and the minor likewise.

21. That the major is false my proof is that, in the case of every essential order, the unity of a prior can essentially stand with a plurality of posteriors that do not per se inhere in the prior and are not adequate to it; a subject is essentially prior to the disposition that is posited as inherent in it (for it does not per se or adequately inhere in it);     therefore etc     .

22. The antecedent here [n.21] is proved by a likeness with cause and effect, because there can be one cause for several effects; and although an effect here does not exist in the cause, yet there is no greater repugnance in posteriors that do inhere (provided however they do not inhere per se) than in other posteriors that exist in something per se, because then there is no intrinsic cause for unity to follow on unity (and especially if the unities are not adequate), such that one of them in its actuality determines the potentiality of the receiver; there is, then, no contradiction in even several absolutes of the same idea being per accidens present in the same thing to which one of them is adequate.

23. The antecedent [n.21] is also proved in the case of some things as to the fact, because several imaginative species exist in the same organ of imagination, otherwise when one species of one imaginable thing was destroyed, no one could perfectly imagine any imaginable; and it is plain that the imaginative species are of the same species, as are also the objects by which they are generated; and they are in the same part of the organ, because the organ could not be divided into all the many minimal parts that can per se be formed for all the many separately existing imaginables that can at once exist in the whole organ; therefore it is necessary that there not be in the organ distinct parts corresponding to the imaginables.

24. And if it be objected ‘why then can the same quantity not be altered by an operation of nature into possessing at once many qualities of the same idea?’ - I reply that, since there are in a subject many powers for many forms of numerically the same species, then, if some act is not introduced in it that contains all the acts that can be present in the perfectible subject, the total potentiality of the receiving subject does not reach its term, and so there is no contradiction in some other form existing in it at the same time; and yet in fact no other form is introduced by a natural agent, because a natural agent intends a pre-existing imperfect form, for it introduces some reality that is of a nature to be a part along with the pre-existing reality; and it unites it to the preexisting reality as part to part, and so it does not introduce a form altogether other; there would however be no repugnance in a form being other provided the subject be not diversified because of it, because a subject having a potentiality for several forms of the same species is unlimited in some way with respect to them - and a thing unlimited with respect to certain things does not have to be multiplied along with them.

25. The aforesaid reason [n.21] proceeds about several absolutes in the same perfectible subject; but even if it not entail the intended conclusion, yet this conclusion is more easily proved about relations of the same species.

First because, as paternity is founded on ‘having generated’, so ‘this paternity’ is founded on ‘this having generated’, and ‘this filiation’ is founded on ‘this having been generated’; by this paternity then does the father regard this son first by this filiation.

26. Further, correlatives by nature go together, so that when one is destroyed the other is too - therefore, when this filiation in this son is destroyed, this paternity in this father is destroyed; therefore if paternity in relation to a second son remain when the first paternity to the first son is destroyed, it follows that the paternity to the second son was different from the paternity to the first son, for no new relation arises because of the fact the first son is removed, just as neither does a new generation come to a first son by positing that a second was generated while the first son is living.

27. Further, when something is of a certain sort ultimately by something else, the sort cannot remain in it unless what has the sort is of that sort by that something else (as whiteness cannot remain on a surface if the surface is not white, and especially if the surface is white ultimately by whiteness); but a relation is that by which what has the relation is ultimately related to another; therefore a relation cannot remain the same in something unless what it remains in is related to another by that relation, but it does not remain the same when the term is destroyed relative to which what has the relation is said to be formally such by the relation.a

a.a [Interpolation] therefore because of some other term.

28. Further, a father has in some way a respect different relative to this son and relative to that son; if the respect is different by a different relation, the intended conclusion is got; if by a different respect of the same idea, the intended conclusion is again got, for the respects will be of the same idea because of foundations that are the same in species; similarly this is false, because a respect is not always founded on a relation as being something other than the relation, for positing two such things is superfluous; but if the respects are the same in the relation on which they are founded, then to say the respect is multiplied is the same as to say the relation is; therefore the intended conclusion is got.

29. Further, distinction in a prior naturally entails distinction in a posterior; but a supposit that is related precedes not only the relation but also the foundation; therefore when the foundation is multiplied so is the relation - and so it is in the issue at hand, that since there are two foundations, there will be two relations.

30. Further the minor of the reason [n.16] is false, because eternal filiation and temporal filiation are not of the same idea - and this is especially true according to them [sc. Henry of Ghent and his followers], because they themselves say that nothing of the same idea can be asserted of the temporal and of the eternal.